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Abstract--This paper proposes a novel remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards which allows both the 
authentication server (AS) and the user to verify each other’s 
authenticity. Our scheme is efficient enough to resist the known 
attacks that could be launched against remote user 
authentication process. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the proliferation of distributed computing, remote user 
authentication has become an important task in many 
applications like e-commerce, e-banking etc. As the 
communications in the authentication process are considered 
to occur over insecure channels, there is the chance of leaking 
out secret information and thus causing serious harm to the 
user. In this paper, we propose a novel and efficient remote 
user authentication scheme using smart cards which allows 
both the AS and the user to verify each other. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
states the related works, Section III mentions the 
preliminaries, Section IV presents our scheme, Section V 
contains a brief analysis, and Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
[1] proposed a remote user authentication scheme based on 
the ElGamal’s public key cryptosystem. [2] increased the 
efficiency of [1] by reducing the computation and 
communication costs. [3] showed that, [1] is vulnerable to 
masquerading attack. Later, in [4] the authors showed a 
different type of attack on [1] and proposed a modified and 
enhanced scheme for making it resistant against the known 
attacks. In 2003, [5] showed that, [2] is vulnerable to offline 
and online password guessing attacks and [6] is vulnerable to 
parallel session attack. 
Most of the works mentioned above ensure that the AS 
could verify the authenticity of the user but the user cannot 
verify the validity of the AS. Hence, our scheme aims at 
achieving bilateral verification maintaining robust security of 
the scheme so that it could be resistant to the known attacks in 
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remote user authentication process using smart cards. 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
We use LU decomposition [7] for our scheme. LU 
decomposition is a procedure for decomposing a square 
matrix A ( N ×N) into a product of a lower triangular matrix 
L and an upper triangular matrix U, such that,  
                                    A = LU                                          (1) 
Where, lower triangular matrix L and upper triangular 
matrix U have the forms, 
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 So, for a square matrix of 4 × 4, equation (1) looks like: 
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According to the definition, elementary matrix E is an N × 
N matrix if it can be obtained from the identity matrix In by 
using one and only one elementary row operation (e.g., 
elimination, scaling, or interchange) [8], [10]. Elementary row 
operations are, ji RR ↔ , ii RcR ↔ , iji RcRR ↔+ . If 
the elementary matrices corresponding to the row operations 
that we use are, E1, E2 ….. Ek, then, Ek….E2E1A = U. Hence, A 
= (Ek….E2E1)-1U or L = E
1−
k … E
1
2
− E 11
−   
IV. OUR BILATERAL AUTHENTICATION SCHEME 
A. Pre-processing - Symmetric Matrix Creation 
At first, a secret symmetric key matrix A 
(dimension NN × ) is generated by the AS, where N is the 
maximum number of users that could be supported. Each 
element Aij of A is assigned a distinct key from a key pool 
(generated earlier) such that, Aij = Aji for, i, j = N,1 . Then, 
LU-decomposition is applied on the matrix A to get L and U. 
B. Details of Our Scheme 
Our scheme has mainly two phases – User Registration 
Phase, Login & Bilateral Authentication Phase. 
User Registration Phase: We assume that, this phase 
occurs over a secure channel. Let Fh be a secure one-way hash 
function [9]. In the registration phase, the user Ua with 
identity IDa first submits his identity (IDa) and arbitrarily 
chosen password PWa to the AS for registration. In turn the 
AS does the following steps: 
1. Generates two random numbers x and y within the range 
N (the dimension of the matrices). 
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2. It selects the xth row from L matrix LR(x), xth column 
from U matrix UC(x), and yth column from U matrix UC(y). 
3. Computes LR(x)×UC(y)=Kxy and θ=Fh(IDa ⊕ Kxy)⊕PWa 
4. Issues a smart card containing (Fh, Kxy, ν, UC(x), θ), to 
the user, where ν = ( yφ ⊕ ) with ϕ is an arbitrary number 
which is kept secret and owned by the authentication server.  
Login & Bilateral Authentication Phase: When the user 
needs to login, he attaches the smart card to the input device 
and keys in his identity IDa and password PWa. The smart 
card performs the following operations: 
1. Generates a random number r with the same length of 
Kxy and computes Ha = Kxy ⊕ Fh(r), and Sa = θ ⊕ PWa ⊕ r. 
2. Sends the login request message, M = (IDa, Ha, ν, UC(x), 
Sa, T), (here, T is the current timestamp) to the AS. 
After getting M, the AS performs the operations: 
1. Checks the validity of IDa. If the format is different than 
the allowed format, it rejects the request. 
2. Tests the time interval (T′ - T) ≤ ΔT, where T′ is the 
timestamp of receiving the message M and ΔT is the 
maximum allowed time interval for transmission delay. If ΔT 
is greater than its boundary condition, the request is rejected. 
3. Now AS computes, ( φ⊕ν ) which eventually generates 
the value of y. AS now knows which row is to be selected 
from the L matrix for this user and selects the yth row LR(y) 
and computes, LR(y)×UC(x) = Kyx  
4. Computes t = Fh(IDa ⊕ Kyx), and r′ = t ⊕ Sa. 
5. Computes, Ha ⊕ Fh(r′), which is expected to generate the 
value of Kxy for a legitimate user, as r′ should be equal to the 
randomly generated number in the user side, r. 
6. Now the server checks whether the condition, Kxy = Kyx 
holds or not. If it does not hold, the server detects the user Ua 
as an invalid user otherwise as a valid user. For the invalid 
users, the server rejects the login request and for the legitimate 
users, it proceeds to the next steps. 
7. Computes M′ = Fh(Kyx X-NOR  T′′), where T′′ is the 
current timestamp, X-NOR means the bitwise Exclusive-NOR 
(XNOR) operation and sends (M′, T′′) to the user Ua.  
Upon receiving this message from the AS, the user Ua,  
1. Verifies the boundary condition, T′′′-T′′ ≤ ΔT, where T′′′ 
is the timestamp of receiving the message.  
2. Then it computes, Fh(Kxy  X-NOR  T′′) and if it equals to 
the received M′, the user verifies the legitimacy of the AS.  
As a symmetric matrix is used for LU-decomposition, 
Kxy=Kyx and the procedure works for the legitimate 
authentication server and user. Thus, we ensure bilateral 
verification in our scheme. 
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In this section we analyze our scheme in brief. 
Replay Attacks: Replaying an old login request, (IDa, Ha, 
ν, UC(x), Sa, T) could not do any harm as, in the second step 
of the login & authentication phase in the AS, this will be 
rejected. 
Masquerade Attack: Our scheme is resistant to 
masquerading attack presented in [3] as, our algorithm does 
not derive any password based on the identity of the user, 
rather it is chosen by the user and an attacker must have pre-
stored other information to masquerade a legitimate user. 
Eavesdropping: By eavesdropping, an attacker could get 
little information that could be useful. In fact, even if the 
attacker knows Uc(x), without knowing the corresponding row 
information or other information, it could not do any harm. 
Forging Attack: No attacker could forge a valid login 
request as it will be detected by the AS during the 
authentication process. 
Other Attacks: Offline and online password guessing 
attacks and parallel session attacks mentioned in [5] could not 
be performed against our scheme as the bilateral 
authentication depends on some pre-stored information.  
As in each step different message formats are used, the 
attacker cannot take advantage of similar previous message to 
use it in any later step. No attacker can compute the hash 
outputs as Fh is a one-way hash function and it is kept secret. 
ϕ is used for hiding the required row number even from the 
user and provides effective security for our algorithm. There is 
no exponential operation in our scheme; hence, the 
computation is fairly easy. For supporting more users, 
multiple symmetric matrices could be used.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards which ensures 
bilateral authentication so that both the parties participating in 
the process could verify each other’s validity.  
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